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Abstract
Most rural development interventions consciously or unconsciously 
make use of local intermediation mechanisms in their endeavour to combat 
poverty at the local level. At the same time, how these local intermediation 
mechanisms occur in practice exerts an important inﬂ  uence on the function-
ing of external development interventions, particularly who enters and who is 
excluded from the provided resources. However, local intermediation cannot 
be completely controlled by an external intervention. As an interface between 
two different worlds, it results from the interaction between an externally 
designed institutional structure and the existing local structures. Sustainable 
poverty reduction, however, requires the opening of local political structures 
in favour of the politically excluded. This makes it important to understand 
how and to which extent external interventions can steer local intermediation, 
in an endeavour to change local political structures. Using the data of a survey 
in 33 Nicaraguan rural villages the paper identiﬁ  es both structural and design 
variables that determine local intermediation and its inﬂ  uence on exclusion 
from aid ﬂ  ows. Special attention is paid to the local legitimacy of local lead-
ers, the reliance on local brokers and the exclusion of the poor.
Key words:
Rural development interventions, intermediation at the community 
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Résumé
La plupart des interventions de développement se servent consciem-
ment ou inconsciemment des mécanismes d’intermédiation locale aﬁ  n de ré-
duire la pauvreté au niveau local. En même temps, les caractéristiques réelles 
de ces mécanismes d’intermédiation inﬂ  uencent de manière importante sur le 
fonctionnement d’interventions externes de développement, particulièrement 
sur la détermination des ‘inclus’ et des ‘exclus’ d’un programme d’aide. Ce-
pendant, l’intermédiation locale ne peut pas être contrôlée complètement par 
une intervention externe. Comme une interface entre deux mondes différents, 
elle est le résultat de l’interaction entre une structure conçue de l’extérieur et 
les structures locaux. La réduction durable de la pauvreté, cependant, requiert 
une ouverture des structures politiques locaux au proﬁ  t de ceux qui en sont 
écartés politiquement. Cela devient important pour comprendre comment et 
jusqu’à quel niveau des interventions externes peuvent diriger l’intermédiation 
locale, aﬁ  n de changer les structures politiques locaux. En utilisant les don-
nées d’une enquête dans 33 villages nicaraguayens, le papier identiﬁ  e des 
variables structurelles et politiques qui déterminent l’intermédiation locale et 
l’inﬂ  uence de celle-ci sur l’exclusion des ﬂ  ux d’aide. Nous prenons en compte 
la légitimité locale des dirigeants communautaires, l’emploi des courtiers lo-
caux et l’exclusion des pauvres.6 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-03
1. Introduction
    Within the development debate there has been an increased at-
tention to the local level. There is a growing belief that it is at this level that 
poverty reduction initiatives should be directed. Local people have better 
knowledge about their environment that is of crucial importance for the anal-
ysis of the problems and the search for possible solutions. Moreover, since it 
is their situation that is to be improved, poverty reduction initiatives have to 
know what local people consider valuable. Therefore, themes such as democ-
ratisation, decentralisation and participatory development have gained wide 
acceptance. However, at the same time there has been a growing awareness 
that the inclusion of these themes in development policies does not automati-
cally lead to better development results.
One of the crucial dimensions that are at play here is the articulation 
between external support and the local level, and how this articulation inﬂ  u-
ences the impact of this external support. Both institutional design and local 
social capital have been indicated as crucial determinants of this articulation 
(Khwaja, 2000; Klitgaard, 1994; Krishna, 2001). Part of the articulation con-
sists of the local support that is needed for each local development interven-
tion to be able to function properly. Local demands need to be identiﬁ  ed, often 
beneﬁ  ciaries must be selected and compliance of mutual agreements must be 
monitored and enforced. Local people have clear informational advantages. 
However, local people who intermediate between external and local actors 
and who claim to represent the community may be poorly accountable to lo-
cal people. Moreover, it is not guaranteed that they represent all local interests 
(Conning & Kevane, 2002; Galasso & Ravallion, 2001; Platteau & Abraham, 
2002). Also it is not guaranteed that local intermediaries will unconditionally 
support the development agenda of the external intervention. Without doubt, 
there exists a real trade-off between on the one hand the information advan-
tages of local intermediaries and thus their bridge-building capacity, and on 
the other hand the accountability both towards the local people and the exter-
nal intervention.
The exact nature of this trade-off depends on the contractual structure 
that is designed by the intervention and on the characteristics of the locality 
where the intervention is operating. These factors should be taken into ac-
count when an appropriate intermediation scheme is to be designed, i.e. that 
is optimal for the functioning of the intervention and local people. This con-
tribution analyses the nature of this intermediation problem.
The paper has the following structure. After this short introduction a 
second section will present an overview of several theoretical and empirical 
studies that contribute to a better understanding of this interface problem, 
while a third section complements them with some conceptual speciﬁ  cations 
of our own on the local arenas. A fourth section presents the data of a survey 
that was realised in 33 rural communities in Nicaragua. With the help of IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-03 • 7
these data several multivariate models were created to look for explanatory 
variables of the local legitimacy of village leaders, intermediation structures 
at the village level and the exclusion of development support. A ﬁ  nal section 
concludes the paper, underlining some important aspects for the policy-mak-
ing of development interventions that work at the local level.
2.  The Local Intermediation Problem
2.1. The  local  level
    What is referred to as “local”? Uphoff (1993) identiﬁ  ed 10 levels 
of decision-making that affect development, of which 3 levels are considered 
to be “local”. They are the locality level, the community level and the group 
level. For the purpose of our study we select the community level, also known 
as the village level. We believe this level has some speciﬁ  c characteristics 
that other levels have not. It is at this level that most projects are operating 
and that an external-local interface appears. Moreover, it is in this residential 
unit where group size is not too large that frequent and continuous interac-
tion between people takes place. These local interactions are of the utmost 
importance for resource management problems, such as the generation and 
local distribution of outside ‘aid’ ﬂ  ows.
The most studied resource management problem at the local level, how-
ever, has been the creation and maintenance of local common pool goods, 
where co-operation is needed to optimise resource allocation and use, such 
as watersheds (Krishna & Uphoff, 1999), ﬁ  shing grounds (Baland & Plat-
teau, 1996), pasture ﬁ  elds, etc. Game-theoretic approaches, inspired by the 
prisoner’s dilemma literature, show how important information and trust are 
to establish local co-operation. Communities have the potential to surmount 
the non-cooperative optimal strategy of the prisoner’s dilemma. They have a 
group-size that is not too large so that situations with perfect information and 
repeated interaction can be approximated. Suchlike set-up has the potential to 
create reputation and sanction mechanisms that are sufﬁ  ciently supported by 
all actors, who when taking account of the long-term consequences of their 
behaviour would support the cooperative strategy (Baland & Platteau, 1996; 
Hayami, 1997; Ostrom, 1991; Platteau & Abraham, 2002).
Another equally important but less studied problem of resource man-
agement at the local level arises when external private goods are channelled 
to the community and individually allocated. In such a situation the incen-
tive structures are, however, quite different than with the provision of local 
common pool goods. While in the latter case community members are both 
intermediaries and beneﬁ  ciaries, with the provision of private goods some 
beneﬁ  ciaries are not active in the intermediation and thus have different inter-
ests than those who intermediate. Since beneﬁ  ts are targeted towards speciﬁ  c 
individuals who are not necessarily intermediaries, performance is less veriﬁ  -
able and peer monitoring may be less useful (Conning & Kevane, 2002)1.
1  However, certain aspects within 
the provision of private goods can 
also have a public character. An 
intervention can condition future 
cooperation on the compliance of 
certain individual actions (e.g. col-
lective reputation towards a credit 
programme). In such a situation the 
good relation of the community 
with the external intervention as 
source of future private goods be-
comes a common pool good.8 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-03
Both resource management problems, however, are not unrelated. El-
ster (1989) classiﬁ  ed problems of order of society into collective action prob-
lems (such as the management of local common pool goods) and bargaining 
problems (such as the individual allocation of private goods). While free-rider 
problems are identiﬁ  ed as principal obstacle for the ﬁ  rst problem, the main 
obstacle for the second problem is the lack of agreement on the distribution 
of the beneﬁ  ts. In his work he addressed the possible interactions between 
bargaining and collective action.
Collective action problems and bargaining problems have also some 
explanatory variables in common. First, as illustrated by Elster (1989) both 
problems are inﬂ  uenced by social norms. Second, they are both inﬂ  uenced 
by social networks. In a similar way as social networks are determinant for a 
successful management of local common pool goods, the social networks in 
which certain local people who provide the link with the exterior are embed-
ded, may inﬂ  uence the local allocation of externally provided private goods.
2.2.  The link with the “outside”
    We now extend our reﬂ  ection to the link with the outside. Krish-
na (2001) showed how capable agency at the local-external interface is needed 
to transform local social capital within local communities - deﬁ  ned as the 
presence and quality of locally important informal networks - into ﬂ  ows of 
beneﬁ  ts. In other words local social capital or “integration”-type social capital 
as deﬁ  ned by Woolcock (1998), is not sufﬁ  cient to guarantee a high develop-
ment performance but should be complemented with synergetic relations with 
external actors. This is similar to the argument of Evans (1996) on the need 
of the scaling-up of local social capital into synergetic relations with external 
actors. Here, synergy is understood as complementarities between local com-
munities and external actors that lead to positive-sum results, i.e. increasing 
the size of the cake. 
The other dimension of synergy, as deﬁ  ned by Evans (1996), is the local 
embeddedness of the relations with external actors. Here, the basic question 
becomes if local networks can cross the community boundary and become a 
new dimension of social capital rather than instruments of rent seeking. This 
leads us from the size of the cake to the distribution of the cake. Local social 
capital is not only needed for high development, but as we will show it is also 
important in the way it leads local agency to foster an equitable distribution 
of the resource ﬂ  ows over the community.
However, contrary to what numerous external development interven-
tions implicitly assume, the existence of good integration within rural com-
munities is not always guaranteed. The picture of local communities as co-
operating entities is in practice too romantic. It is much more accurate to IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-03 • 9
conceptualise them as conﬂ  icting entities. Often information is not that 
perfect as assumed and different conﬂ  icting interests co-exist, which may 
result in a community failure (Bowles & Gintis, 2001; Hayami, 1997). 
Recently, a lot of critique has been directed to participatory methods for 
research (Goebel, 1998) and development initiatives (Cooke & Kothari, 
2001; Leeuwis, 2000; Platteau & Abraham, 2002) because of their erro-
neous assumptions of homogenous interests and needs in the communi-
ties, which mask the existing power relations and tensions.
Not only pre-existing power relations between the intervention (the 
intervention’s interests) and the community often predetermine the re-
sults of participatory exercises in terms of ‘knowledge’ creation (Mosse, 
2001), but also internal power relations within the community may ex-
ert determinant inﬂ  uence on the results. The creation and distribution of 
knowledge may be severely biased since not all people are equally rep-
resented in the public space. If external interventions do not sufﬁ  ciently 
take into account local power structures, participatory exercises may be 
unable to achieve their principal aim of obtaining a representative picture 
of the community. More than that, if the thus biased picture is used to 
direct actions, interventions may, unconsciously, reinforce local power 
structures (Kothari, 2001).
Another difﬁ  culty with the community level consists in the ﬂ  ex-
ibility of the community concept itself. Often local community lead-
ers who manage the relations with external interventions strategically 
present their community in such a way as to increase the probability of 
acceptance by external development personnel, for example by conceal-
ing internal conﬂ  icts or by changing the borders of the community. Since 
it is their representation position that enables them to get in touch and 
negotiate with external interventions, an interesting question is to what 
extent these local leaders are accountable to both local people and exter-
nal interventions.
2.3. Local  development  “brokers”
    Within the thus created trinity of development intervention, 
community and local intermediaries, we will focus on the position of the 
latter. They fulﬁ  l a bridging function between the two often extremely 
different worlds of the development intervention and the local commu-
nity. They form a kind of interface between two social and cultural con-
ﬁ  gurations where negotiation, strategic behaviour, multiple discourses 
and knowledge processes take a central place (Long, 2001).
Many local intermediaries only occasionally realise mediating 
tasks. Others are specialised “development brokers” who act on a more 
continuous basis. The latter have attracted the attention of several devel-
opment anthropologists (Bierschenk et al., 2000; Laurent, 2001). Some of 10 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-03
these brokers had already a pivotal position within the community before the 
arrival of development interventions, while others on the contrary gained this 
position thanks to the arrival of these interventions. By exploiting informa-
tional asymmetries local brokers maintain their position as an indispensable 
link between development interventions and the local community. For local 
people, local brokers have some characteristics that give them a compara-
tive advantage to get in touch with external actors and to attract resources 
to the community. Most brokers are higher educated and more mobile than 
other village members. That is why they manage the discourse that pleases 
the development interventions and they are able to use the available margin 
to manoeuvre and sell a good picture of their community. For the external 
intervention these brokers have better local information, they have the capac-
ity to contribute to the analysis of local problems, and they have the ability to 
convoke and convince local people. 
Institutional economics has addressed brokerage by means of the prin-
cipal-agent framework that is characterised by information asymmetries that 
arise after the signing of a contract between a ‘principal’ and someone who is 
hired to take some action for him as an ‘agent’ (Arrow, 1985; Hart & Holm-
strom, 1987). The resulting information asymmetries create a shirking prob-
lem that encourages the principal, who wants to enforce contract compliance 
by the agent, to look for an effective contract design. By taking an inter -
mediary position between the external intervention and the community the 
development broker becomes an agent for both the development intervention 
and the community. In this way a double principal-agent problem is created, 
although – as explained above – the community can hardly be considered a 
clearly identiﬁ  able and purposeful principal, as it seldom has clear uniﬁ  ed 
interests.
In case of large differences between the ‘local’ and the ‘external’ world 
the use of local brokers might substantially reduce transaction costs for both 
parties, i.e. the external intervention and the community. At the same time 
the information asymmetries give these brokers a certain margin to reconcile 
the not seldom conﬂ  icting interests of both parties. Since local brokers are 
expected to defend the interests of both sides, they are in an ambivalent po-
sition, wherein they must always pay attention to the risks of becoming too 
unpopular with one of both parties (Bierschenk et al., 2000).
This tension is not only the result of the different interests and expec-
tations of both worlds but also depends on both the institutional design of 
the external intervention - for instance the exact responsibilities that are at-
tributed to local brokers - and local characteristics that have an independent 
inﬂ  uence on the interaction between local ‘knowledge’ and outsider agendas. 
To obtain satisfactory results interventions have to design an intermediation 
scheme that in articulation with local characteristics manages to cope satis-
factorily with information asymmetries and local political complexities.IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-03 • 11
2.4. Beneﬁ  ciary selection and poverty reduction as local political  
  change
   The  beneﬁ  ciary selection problem has been extensively docu-
mented by a literature that focuses on the mechanisms used to target certain 
groups (Skouﬁ  as, Davis & de la Vega, 2001; Van de Walle & Nead, 1995; Van 
de Walle, 1998). Very recently, the black box of mechanisms at the intra-com-
munity level that affect targeting has been opened (Alderman, 2001; Conning 
& Kevane, 2002; Galasso & Ravallion, 2001; Rai, 2002). This recent litera-
ture indicates that the potential comparative advantages of the use of com-
munity intermediaries consist in their superior access to local information 
and their higher embeddedness in local networks. Using local intermediaries 
has the potential to improve screening mechanisms and distribution, all this 
at lower transaction costs. However, the centre can only imperfectly monitor 
local intermediaries, and therefore the comparative advantages of the use of 
local brokers might be eroded by moral hazard. 
Sen (1995) already indicated that targeting is as much a political and 
sociological problem as an economic problem. Gelbach and Pritchett (1997) 
showed how the lack of political support of the local elite might affect target-
ing. They explain how a higher tax burden reduces the support of the local 
elite for redistribution, so that “more for the poor may actually mean less for 
the poor”. However, also without resorting to a tax system, a minimum sup-
port of the local elite, to which most local brokers belong, is needed to reach 
the poor.
Although local brokers, who form a large part of the local elite, poten-
tially receive a lot of beneﬁ  ts of intermediating between external and local 
actors (such as political support and loyalty of local people, reputation and 
even personal satisfaction of being a good leader, etc.), in most cases these 
beneﬁ  ts are not sufﬁ  cient for them to be disposed to support outside agendas. 
In most cases a share in the channelled resources is an unavoidable additional 
condition. This considerably reduces the potential of targeting to induce more 
profound structural transformations.
For those who deﬁ  ne poverty reduction as income increases of the poor, 
this would not be a reason of preoccupation under the condition that the re-
sources are optimally allocated in terms of cost-effectiveness. Under certain 
conditions targeting is warranted, while under other conditions universal 
provision of external private resources – i.e. without imposing any selection 
criteria – can be more cost-effective to reduce income poverty (Van de Walle, 
1998).
However, for others – including us – poverty reduction does not only 
have an economic dimension but also includes the opening of local political 
structures towards the poor whatever economic impact it could have. Poverty 
reduction is broadened to include political change in favour of the poor who 
are politically excluded (Bastiaensen et al, 2003), and to reach the poor and 12 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-03
poorest as such is placed in the forefront again. This relational dimension of 
poverty is directly related to the processes that create and maintain poverty 
(Webster & Engberg-Pedersen, 2001). Thus, to induce structural changes re-
quired for poverty reduction to be sustainable, poverty reduction programmes 
have to become political entrepreneurs who try to by-pass the local elite and 
to ﬁ  nd new actors outside of the local elite who can represent the politically 
excluded.
Also within the microﬁ  nance literature, the difﬁ  culties to reach the 
poorest have been increasingly documented (CGAP, 2002; Hickson, 2001; 
Morduch, 2000; Navajas et al., 2000; Rhyne, 1998). It is now widely accepted 
that microﬁ  nance institutions should aim at ﬁ  nancial sustainability. Reaching 
the poor while maintaining ﬁ  nancial sustainability, however, is not an easy 
job. Costs relating to beneﬁ  ciary selection and the speciﬁ  cation and enforce-
ment of ﬁ  nancial contracts are relatively ﬁ  xed per credit transaction. That is 
why ﬁ  nancial operations with poorer clients tend to entail higher transaction 
costs per unit of loan volume. This hampers microﬁ  nance programs to con-
struct a portfolio that amply covers the poorer sectors (Barham et al., 1996). 
In addition to this transaction-cost rationing, for microﬁ  nance pro-
grams the initial selection and intermediation problems become signiﬁ  cantly 
more complex since the access to external resources is conditioned upon the 
posterior compliance with certain conditions. Particularly, the willingness 
(moral hazard) and capacity to accept and respect the contract from the ben-
eﬁ  ciary’s point of view become important additional selection criteria. For 
programs that aim at ﬁ  nancial sustainability this makes a crucial difference.
Both transaction cost rationing and the complication of the selection 
problem result from information asymmetries, which are to be kept under 
control by appropriate local intermediation schemes. While the use of lo-
cal intermediation helps microﬁ  nance programs to reduce these information 
problems – it actually forms the principal source of their success in terms of 
beneﬁ  ciary selection and contract compliance –, it is increasingly documented 
that local intermediation between the local and the external level as part of lo-
cal agency is more diverse and complex than generally assumed (Bastiaensen 
& D’Exelle, 2002; Conning, 1999; Vaessen et al., 2002; Van Bastelaer, 1999). 
Informational advantages and multiple relationships within the community 
make it easier for local intermediaries to enforce contract compliance. How-
ever, local intermediaries may have other interests and incentives than the 
external actor, which can induce them to behave in a way that lowers the net 
beneﬁ  ts for the intervention. To prevent this, the incentives provided by the 
project should always be larger than the possible losses local intermediaries 
undergo, for example by deteriorating relationships with certain local people 
because of enforcing contract compliance. If not, the use of local intermediar-
ies may even become a catalysing factor of local collective protests against 
the development intervention.IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-03 • 13
3. Local  Arenas  Around  Development  Interventions
    In this section we will brieﬂ  y conceptualise the arenas that arise 
around external development interventions. Bierschenk & Olivier De Sardan 
(1997) deﬁ  ne arenas as “place[s] of concrete confrontation between social 
actors on common issues”. Without doubt around each development interven-
tion an arena arises as different interests are confronted with each other. An 
important dimension of these local arenas is the way the relations between 
external interventions and local beneﬁ  ciaries are established, and especially 
what local intermediation mechanisms are used.
Figure 1 presents the structure of the local intermediation between an 
external development intervention and local beneﬁ  ciaries. The three double 
arrows indicate the possible relations between a development intervention, 
local intermediaries and ﬁ  nal beneﬁ  ciaries. Each arrow indicates a poten-
tial transfer of resources and/or information or the realisation of a certain 
action. A double arrow can indicate a unilateral engagement or a bilateral 
engagement. In the latter case, two actors commit themselves to interchange 
resources, information or actions and they enter into an implicit or explicit 
contractual relation. This means that in addition to a selection problem (with 
whom should a relation be established?), which is not limited to a contractual 
relation, an enforcement problem (whether the actors comply with their com-
mitments) appears.
A poverty reduction program has certain hypotheses on local poverty 
and how to reduce it. For this it elaborates certain objectives that it wants to 
attain by, among other things, transferring (ﬁ  nancial/material) resources to 
speciﬁ  c beneﬁ  ciaries in the area where it wants to combat poverty (arrow 1a). 
Some interventions transfer private resources to beneﬁ  ciaries without expect-
ing any contribution of the beneﬁ  ciaries. Other interventions enter into a real 
contractual relation by imposing certain contributions that the beneﬁ  ciaries 
should realise after the transfer of the private goods, such as reproduction and 
distribution to other community members, or repayment (in kind or money) 
of the transferred goods.
However, in most cases the intervention does not have sufﬁ  cient infor-
mation or capacity to realise a good selection of local beneﬁ  ciaries and to en-
force contract compliance. That is why on the ﬁ  eld the external intervention 
has to take recourse to local intermediaries (arrow 2a). The tasks executed 
by these intermediary persons can differ a lot but in most cases these ac-
tors can exert an important inﬂ  uence on beneﬁ  ciary selection and contract 
compliance2. At the same time there are other intermediaries who are not 
contacted by the intervention with these intentions - and thus invisible to the 
intervention - but who take actions that can inﬂ  uence the operations of the in-
tervention. An important category of these intermediaries is the beneﬁ  ciaries 
of the intervention. Each beneﬁ  ciary is a potential intermediary between the 
intervention and potential new beneﬁ  ciaries.
2  In contrast with the intermedi-
ary persons we have to notice that 
local staff – although often also em-
bedded in local social networks – is 
assumed to behave in accordance 
with the objectives of the interven-
tion and is not considered to be 
a separate intermediating category 
(between the intervention and the 
community) in the ﬁ  gure.14 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-03
Concurrently, local people consider anti-poverty interventions as im-
portant opportunities in their search for a way out of poverty (arrow 1b). How-
ever, for them it is often all but evident to become ‘visible’ or to get in contact 
with these interventions. That is why they too have to resort to intermediary 
persons (arrow 3a) who transfer information on the access conditions and the 
terms of contract – if any – or who have even real selection power.
Here, we must emphasise the difference between local leaders, local in-
termediaries and brokers. With ‘local intermediaries’ we refer to local persons 
who intermediate on a regular or occasional basis between local people and 
external actors that channel external resources to the community. For local 
intermediaries to become brokers, they have to be ‘local leaders’ as well, i.e. 
persons who represent local people towards other parties. They need a man-
date of local people. This enables them to specialise in mediating tasks and 
to act on a more continuous basis. Thus, there are local leaders who are not 
brokers because they do not intermediate any external resources – although 
this category is somewhat limited, as most leaders do exert some inﬂ  uence 
on local intermediation – and there are people who exert an inﬂ  uence on the 
transfer of external resources to the local level but who do not represent local 
people, so they are not local brokers either.
Often the ﬁ  nal beneﬁ  ciaries maintain a (often implicit) contractual rela-
tionship with these brokers by whom they are taken into account in exchange 
for political support. These contractual relations are embedded within the ex-
isting social networks. Also for local intermediary persons who are not local 
leaders and thus do not need political support, it is clear that the relations that 
they maintain with other community members are determinant (arrow 3b) 
as these are the carriers of information and recommendations. At the same 
time, for brokers specialised in these intermediation activities, their relation 
with external interventions (arrow 2b) guarantees them a privileged access 
to external resources and local power. These take an important space within 
their livelihood strategy. Often the relationships these brokers maintain with 
external interventions are based on mutual commitment. In return of their 
intermediating activity these local brokers expect to beneﬁ  t of the channelled 
external resources.IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-03 • 15
Figure 1. The conceptual framework
The ﬁ  nal constellation of this structure can vary a lot3. It is the result 
of the interaction of external and local actors that act in correspondence with 
their individual objectives and strategies. At the same time, individual strate-
gies are elaborated as reaction to the broader structure and the local social 
structures in which local actors are embedded. Concomitantly, while external 
development interventions by means of design variables (arrows 1a and 2a) 
can exert some inﬂ  uence on the local translation of their development support, 
local variables remain crucial. We are especially interested in the inﬂ  uence 
that both design variables and community variables exert on local interme-
diation structures and on the ﬁ  nal outcome in terms of inclusion/exclusion of 
the poor of the channelled resources. Finally, we have to clarify that in most 
villages several interventions are working simultaneously, so that the scheme 
in ﬁ  gure 1 should be applied to the totality of interventions present in each 
village.
4. The  Data
    To study the local intermediation of external interventions in 
Nicaragua a survey was realised in 33 rural villages, with approximately 50 
observations per village. Translating Uphoff’s (1993) classiﬁ  cation of “local” 
levels to the Nicaraguan context, we decided to deﬁ  ne established socio-eco-
nomic residential units of between 70 and 250 households as “communities” 
or “villages” (both are used as synonyms throughout the paper), while we 
deﬁ  ned smaller populations as “groups” and larger populations as “localities”. 
We believe these residential units have some speciﬁ  c characteristics that units 
with smaller or larger populations have not4.
3  Development  interventions  of-
ten condition the transfer of exter-
nal resources upon the formation 
of a local representative unit (i.e. a 
group of interlocutors often in the 
form of a local committee). Most 
committees are little democratic 
in Nicaraguan rural areas and are 
dominated by one broker who 
monopolises the contact with the 
intervention. The other members 
often do not play a brokerage role 
but are occasional intermediaries.
4  The theoretical number of rela-
tions that should exist for a popu-
lation to become completely con-
nected is calculated by n2, with n 
equal to the population size. This 
makes that for small population 
sizes it is a lot easier to have highly 
connected networks, while for large 
populations it becomes almost im-
possible. We also expect that there 
exists a range of population sizes 
where highly connected networks 
are not impossible to exist while 
they are neither guaranteed. It is 
this range of population sizes that 
we consider to be a constitutive 
characteristic of “communities” or 
“villages”.16 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-03
We selected 33 rural villages over the whole Paciﬁ  c and Interior region 
of Nicaragua. The selection was realised in such a way as to maximise vari-
ation in socio-economic and geographical characteristics. Variation is very 
large in terms of agrarian structure, history, geographical characteristics, 
economic activities and access to urban centres. Agricultural and/or cattle 
production activities, however, are highly present in all surveyed rural vil-
lages.
The deﬁ  nition of the village boundaries and the elaboration of a vil-
lage census were realised with local support. To reduce the possible polluting 
effects of strategic use of the community concept by local informants we 
consulted and compared different information sources. Out of these censuses 
50 observations were selected randomly in each village. To study the relations 
of local people with external interventions, not only currently active interven-
tions have been taken into account but also recently concluded development 
interventions. This enabled us to have sufﬁ  cient observations of households 
with access to external development support, as few interventions keep work-
ing in the same community for several years. 
4.1.  Types of development interventions
    The local intermediation problem as described in previous sec-
tions is present with all external development interventions that channel pri-
vate goods to individual actors, such as food-for-work programs, food-for-
education programs, technical assistance programs, microﬁ  nance programs, 
etc. We make abstraction of both the type of private goods that are channelled 
and the exact objectives of each program – such as community building, em-
powerment, accumulation of local capacities, economic development, social 
services, etc. – and we only analyse the distribution component of the trans-
ferred private goods. In contrast with studies that focus on one intervention, 
we studied all development interventions together. This permits us to obtain 
more general results and to study the effects of institutional design.
In the 33 villages where the survey was realised we identiﬁ  ed 82 de-
velopment interventions that in some way or another transfer private goods 
or services to individual households. An important variable that differenti-
ates these external development interventions are the access conditions to the 
private goods. Within the contract between development interventions and 
local beneﬁ  ciaries we are especially interested in the cost that interventions 
transfer to local people and on which they condition the access to the private 
goods, since it is along this dimension that a large part of the variation of de-
velopment interventions is observed.
Table 1 presents two important types of conditions that characterise 
this cost. A ﬁ  rst important condition is how much has to be paid for the chan-
nelled goods. Several interventions demand a small contribution (in ﬁ  nancial IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-03 • 17
terms, in terms of time or labour) for the channelled goods, but often this con-
tribution is not considerable in comparison with the value of the channelled 
goods. In such a case we speak of donations. Table 1 shows that 48 projects 
channel material resources by means of donations. 
If considerable part of the cost of the goods has to be paid then this is 
often done by means of a deferred payment, i.e. a credit transaction. This leads 
us to the second important condition, i.e. whether the channelled resources 
have to be returned. In the same table5 we observe that 51 projects channel re-
sources by means of credit transactions. Within this group of interventions we 
distinguish two types. First, interventions that channel resources by means 
of credit transactions can aim for complete recuperation of the resources and 
for full-coverage of operation costs. We call these non-subsidising credit in-
terventions. Second, for subsidising credit interventions the access cost for 
beneﬁ  ciaries is lower since complete recuperation of resources is not funda-
mental – often leading to semi-donated transfers – and operation costs are not 
fully covered by the beneﬁ  ciaries’ contribution.
Table 1. Types of projects
 Donations Total
No Yes
Without credit transactions 5 26 31
16.1% 83.9% 100.0%
Subsidised credit transactions 5 20 25
 20.0% 80.0% 100.0%
Non-subsidised credit transactions 24 2 26
92.3% 7.7% 100.0%
Total 34 48 82
 41.5% 58.5% 100.0%
When crossing both variables, i.e. the transfer of economic resources by 
means of donations and by means of credit transactions, we observe that they 
are highly correlated. Very few projects that offer non-subsidised credit loans 
channel donations, while most projects that offer subsidised credit or that do 
not offer any credit do channel donations. This correlation is a result of the 
fact that both variables are correlated with the level of market-orientedness 
of each project. Therefore, one of both variables may be used to characterise 
the development interventions according to their level of market-orientedness. 
We prefer the use of credit loans since this variable permits us to classify the 
projects in three groups (instead of two). The ﬁ  rst group consists of projects 
without any credit component, to the second group belong projects with sub-
sidised credit loans and the third group consists of projects that offer credit 
loans at market conditions.
5 Crossing both conditions is per-
mitted as a project can simultane-
ously channel different goods at 
different conditions.18 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-03
4.2.  Local intermediation of external development interventions
    For each individual relation with an external development inter-
vention we assessed local intermediation by asking the beneﬁ  ciary how the 
relation was established. As the ﬁ  gures in table 2 show, for the three types 
of projects local intermediation is very important for people to obtain access. 
Local intermediaries may be very important bridges to external development 
interventions since they transmit important information to the local level, they 
may recommend potential beneﬁ  ciaries to project staff or they may have even 
real selection power6. We also see that local brokers, i.e. local intermediaries 
who are also local leaders, are highly present.
Table 2. Mechanisms of access vs. different types of projects 
No-ﬁ  nance Subsidised ﬁ  nance Non-subsidised 
ﬁ  nance
Total
Number of relations with projects 365 752 459 1576
Own initiative 8,5% 7,6% 23,5% 12,4%
Visit by project staff 29,9% 29,5% 29,8% 29,7%
Intermediation by a local leader 
(from the same community)
52,1% 43,6% 22,4% 39,4%
Intermediation by a peer, non-leader
(from the same community)
6,8% 12,6% 16,8% 12,5%
Intermediation by someone from 
outside the community 
3,0% 6,3% 7,0% 5,7%
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Note: The studied mechanisms of access refer to the beneﬁ  ciary’s point of view
In table 3 we crossed local intermediation mechanisms by region and by 
socio-economic group. For the latter variable we calculated a relative poverty 
indicator equal to the inverse of the average of three standardized important 
household level indicators (the number of economic activities7, the number of 
months per year without food difﬁ  culties and the house infrastructure meas-
ured as a composite index of the quality of roof, soil and walls). The number 
of economic activities was standardized by its 5 percent trimmed mean while 
the house infrastructure index and the number of months per year without 
food difﬁ  culties by their ordinary mean. All means are calculated at the vil-
lage level and not for the sample as a whole, as we are interested in relative 
poverty and local inequality. Taking account of the large differences between 
the different socio-economic regions where the sample of villages was taken, 
these are the only household level economic variables measured in the survey 
that we ﬁ  nd appropriate for cross-sectional analysis. 
6 Although important, we do not 
include the mandate that external 
interventions give to local agents 
in our analysis.
7 Accounting each agricultural crop 
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In each community the quartiles of this poverty indicator were calcu-
lated, and each quarter is aggregated over the 33 communities. We observe in 
table 3 that local intermediation is important for all socio-economic groups 
and this in the two regions where the survey was realised. Local interme-
diation (both by local leaders and by peers) is somewhat higher in the more 
densely populated Paciﬁ  c region. In the Interior region people are more de-
pendant on their own initiative. The poor tend to be more dependant on local 
brokers to accede projects, and the more so in the Paciﬁ  c region. In the latter 
region more than 50 percent of all relations with external interventions has 
been intermediated by local brokers for the poorest class, while this class is 
very limitedly contacted directly by project staff.
Table 3 also shows that the channelled resources beneﬁ  t the richer sec-
tors more than the poorer sectors. A lot of poor households are excluded from 
any development support, although in both regions technically this does not 
have to be the case, shown by an average of more than 1 relation per house-
hold. The data seem to indicate that increasing the channelled resources does 
not guarantee that the poorer sectors are more included. While in the paciﬁ  c 
region there are more relations with projects than in the interior region, the 
poorest quarter remains with a similar small average number of relations with 
projects per household.
Table 3. Mechanisms of access vs. poverty vs. region 
Paciﬁ  c Interior
I II III IV Total I II III IV Total
Number of relations with projects 330 292 204 144 970 290 205 191 132 818
Number of relations per household 1,78 1,55 1,04 0,81 1,30 1,71 1,22 1,07 0,80 1,20
Own initiative 9,6% 8,0% 6,8% 6,9% 8,1% 19,5% 14,3% 20,3% 16,1% 17,8%
Visit by project staff 34,8% 27,4% 31,3% 15,3% 29,0% 29,9% 35,4% 24,2% 33,0% 30,4%
Intermediation by a community leader (from 
the same community)
33,9% 42,3% 39,6% 54,2% 40,5% 34,4% 32,3% 36,6% 37,5% 34,9%
Intermediation by a peer, non-leader
(from the same community)
15,3% 15,3% 17,7% 17,6% 16,2% 11,2% 12,4% 13,1% 7,1% 11,2%
Intermediation by someone from outside the 
community
6,4% 6,9% 4,7% 6,1% 6,2% 5,0% 5,6% 5,9% 6,3% 5,5%
  100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Note: The studied mechanisms of access refer to the beneﬁ  ciary’s point of view 
I = richest quarter - IV = poorest quarter.
Local intermediation may actually be higher than shown by tables 2 
and 3, as local people who get in touch with external interventions ‘on their 
own initiative’ may have had contact with local intermediaries before. Since 
local intermediaries often have a privileged access to important information 
of the intervention, such as the type of channelled private goods and the ac-
cess conditions, they are frequently consulted. While the intermediation cat-
egories included in the table are of a “direct intermediation”-type, this last 
type of more hidden local intermediation is of a more “indirect” type.20 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-03
Also seen from the point of view of the project staff local intermedia-
tion may be higher than shown in tables 2 and 3. Although several develop-
ment interventions allege they do not make use of local intermediation, in 
practice all interventions are to a certain extent inﬂ  uenced by local interme-
diation mechanisms. The visits made by project staff may have been guided 
by local recommendations. Project staff makes frequent use of local inform-
ants to start or expand operations, and the information on the project is always 
transmitted by means of social networks within the community. Although we 
do not measure these types of intermediation empirically as they are not cap-
tured by the beneﬁ  ciary’s point of view on the access mechanisms to develop-
ment interventions, we do take account of them as latent mediating variables.
It must also be stressed that local intermediaries are not only important 
to establish individual relations with external development interventions; they 
may also play a vital role in the further development of these relations. Often 
access to external assistance is conditioned upon the compliance of certain 
actions that local brokers are expected to monitor and enforce. Also, re-ne-
gotiation of the contract terms is often needed as the environment is continu-
ously changing.
After the short analysis of pooled data in this section, we will realize 
an inter-village multivariate analysis, which permits us to include village-spe-
ciﬁ  c structural variables, to study in the following sections respectively the 
local legitimacy of village leaders, local intermediation structures and the 
exclusion of development support, all at the village level.
5.  Local Legitimacy of Village Leaders - Brokers
    By taking an intermediary position between external develop-
ment interventions and their beneﬁ  ciaries, local brokers actually become bro-
kers for both parties. They facilitate the legitimisation of their position towards 
both parties by creating a situation wherein both the external interventions 
and the local community need them. They have clear comparative advantages, 
and information asymmetries towards both parties give them certain space to 
manoeuvre. However, sometimes this is not enough to avoid the contesting of 
their legitimacy by one of both parties due to the often-conﬂ  icting demands 
of both parties in a permanently changing environment. While for external 
interventions local brokers should facilitate beneﬁ  ciary selection (respecting 
the intervention’s criteria) and the compliance of contract terms (if necessary) 
by the selected beneﬁ  ciaries, for local people they should take actions that 
sustain their local legitimacy. 
A community, however, has seldom uniﬁ  ed interests and opinions. This 
also applies to the identiﬁ  cation and opinions on local brokers and leaders8. 
Divergence of the opinions on the same local leaders is widespread, the more 
so in divided/polarised communities. That is why in an attempt to measure 
8   For empirical reasons (to guar-
antee a sufﬁ  ciently high number of 
observations) we opt for studying 
the local legitimacy of local lead-
ers, including the leaders that have 
not been identiﬁ  ed as brokers (as 
identiﬁ  ed in our survey as “direct” 
intermediaries). Most of these 
non-brokers leaders, however, are 
highly active within more “indirect” 
intermediation (not measured by 
our survey), so that they too are 
important for the relations with 
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the local legitimacy of local leadership, we aggregated the different opinions 
on all identiﬁ  ed local leaders to create one aggregated index of the local le-
gitimacy of local leadership. We asked each respondent to identify the three 
most important leaders and to evaluate them on their capacity, fairness (the 
degree to which they distribute beneﬁ  ts equally) and unselﬁ  shness (the de-
gree to which they do not take proﬁ  t of their intermediary situation). Each 
one of these three dimensions was measured by one question to which they 
could answer with yes (= 1) or no (= 0). Then, for each dimension the vil-
lage average of all individual leader evaluations was taken. All the three so 
created variables are highly correlated (see annex for correlation matrix). In 
communities where local leadership is perceived to have higher capacity, lo-
cal leadership scores also better on fairness and unselﬁ  shness. Because of the 
high correlation between these three indexes we decided to use the average 
of them to create an index of the local legitimacy of local leadership, denomi-
nated LEAD_LEG.
Before using the empirical material, we present the variables that we 
consider for inclusion in our multivariate model explaining the legitimacy of 
local leadership. A ﬁ  rst important variable that we expect to inﬂ  uence the 
local legitimacy of local leadership is the poverty level of the municipality 
to which the village belongs, POV_MUN. This variable has three possible 
values referring to three ranges of income poverty in the municipality9. In 
poorer villages the need for local leaders is higher as they can be very impor-
tant agents to attract external resources. All actions that have the potential 
to increase local welfare are welcomed, so that generally local leaders are 
unconditionally accepted and remain relatively non-criticized.
However, local leaders are not equally accepted in all conditions. We 
expect local leaders to be more contested in communities where a larger part 
of the locally channelled external resources is intermediated by local brokers 
– measured as the proportion of all individual relations with external interven-
tions that have been established by means of intermediation by local brokers 
(BROK_REL). This has a lot to do with fairness. Local brokers are more vis-
ible than other intermediation mechanisms (such as local intermediation by 
peers non-leaders or other occasional contacts) and can be easily marked to 
be responsible for possible unfair distributions. In poor rural villages the lo-
cal distribution of external resources is a very delicate matter. Local brokers, 
however, generally favour their own networks, which have a limited scope. 
This makes that the more access to development support is intermediated by 
local brokers, the more people feel unfairly treated by some of these brokers.
Another important variable is community social capital. In commu-
nities with higher levels of social capital deﬁ  ned as community unity, it is 
easier for local leaders (and thus also brokers) to obtain or maintain local le-
gitimacy. By deﬁ  nition local leaders are expected to represent the ‘collective 
interest’ and when necessary to catalyse collective action in defence of this 
collective interest. In communities where community unity is higher, col-
9 Source: Dirección de planiﬁ  cación 
– FISE. Municipal poverty is deﬁ  ned 
as the percentage increase of con-
sumption of the poor population 
relative to the poverty line that is 
needed to eliminate poverty. Mu-
nicipalities with a poverty gap equal 
or higher than 21 percent are con-
sidered extremely poor, between 7 
percent and 20 percent are con-
sidered to face medium poverty 
and less than 7 percent to face low 
poverty. In 1995 the poverty line 
equaled an annual consumption of 
US$ 428.94 per capita.22 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-03
lective action is easier to realise and consequently the ruling leaders are less 
contested. Moreover, if local leaders act against the collective interest, it is 
expected that they be more easily contested. To evade replacement they have 
to act in defence of the collective interest. In divided communities, it is less 
evident what is meant by the collective interest and local leaders are more 
contested. However, these communities often lack the means (collective ac-
tion) to replace them, so that local leaders can maintain their position in spite 
of low local legitimacy. 
However, the relation goes also in the other direction. Highly legiti-
mated leadership has a higher capacity to stimulate local collective action, an 
important aspect of social capital as we deﬁ  ned it. This bi-directional causal-
ity forces us to estimate more than one equation simultaneously in a system 
of equations. At the same time we are conscious that the signiﬁ  cance of the 
correlation between community unity (which we would measure by means of 
a village index of perceptions on community life, see section 7 where we de-
ﬁ  ne UNIT_COM) and LEAD_LEG might also be the result of the correlation 
of both perceptions indices with a third factor that is individual-speciﬁ  c such 
as optimism, the way to perceive life, etc. To solve this problem we have to 
do a panel data estimation that enables us to control both household speciﬁ  c 
and village speciﬁ  c variables. For the moment we opt for the drastic and pre-
liminary “solution” of excluding the variable that measures community unity 
from this equation and we will address this problem in future work.
We also expect that the legitimacy of local leaders be inﬂ  uenced by the 
past presence of agrarian reform, measured by the percentage of households 
that received land from the agrarian reform (AGR_REF). The agrarian reform 
in Nicaragua was realised in the 1980s and the early 1990s and in addition 
to the increased land access involved the injection of an enormous amount 
of economic resources to the local level. These resources were locally inter-
mediated by political and (often) opportunistic leaders. This and the fact that 
agrarian reform areas were zones of ‘artiﬁ  cial social creation’ (characterised 
by high levels of immigration) in a context of political polarisation and often 
armed conﬂ  ict resulted in high distrust towards this local leadership. Moreo-
ver, the access of these local brokers to external resources – a very important 
source of their local legitimacy – has now drastically decreased. The agrar-
ian reform created also a lot of new local brokers reducing the concentration 
of local brokerage, which is conﬁ  rmed by the signiﬁ  cant and positive partial 
correlation between AGR_REF and the centralism of local brokerage, CENT_
BROK (0.547; sig. .001***). This increased rivalry between local brokers, so-
cial cleavages in the community and local legitimacy of local leadership. For 
CENT_BROK we used a Herﬁ  ndahl index of all relations with projects that 
are intermediated by brokers, i.e. the sum of the squared shares of the differ-
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One of the comparative advantages of local leaders lies in their educa-
tional superiority. However, in a lot of communities the mean level of educa-
tion has risen in the last decade and the comparative advantage of local lead-
ers is increasingly corroded. More people are able to understand and inspect 
the actions of local leaders. At the same time more persons are capable to 
exert a representative function and to challenge local leaders. Theoretically 
this could enforce local leaders to be more accountable increasing their local 
legitimacy. However, seen from a dynamic perspective we expect it to be all 
but evident to move to this superior equilibrium. Most communities are char-
acterized by centralized leadership and have little experience with democratic 
rules. Traditional leaders tend to interpret the challenges towards their posi-
tion as signs of distrust and ingratitude, which induces them to high resistance. 
That is why we expect that local legitimacy of local leadership decreases with 
increasing village levels of education. To measure the latter variable we ﬁ  rst 
calculated the average education level at the household level considering all 
household members older than 18 years and we then took the village mean of 
all households, excluding the households of local leaders (EDUC_1).
Table 4.  An explanatory model (OLS) of the local legitimacy of
  l o c a l   l e a d e r s
Dependent variable LEAD_LEG
Beta T Sig. Toler.a
POV_MUN 0.439 3.12 .004*** 0.531
BROK_REL -0.298 -2.82 .009*** 0.944
AGR_REF -0.333 -3.13 .004*** 0.929





Prob > chi2 b 0.122
a Tolerance value
b Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity, with Ho: Constant variance
We have tested for the basic assumptions of linear regression. The chi 
square test in table 4 indicates absence of heteroskedasticity. Visual exami-
nation of the partial regression plots has conﬁ  rmed the absence of normality 
and linearity violations. Univariate normality is also conﬁ  rmed in the table of 
descriptive statistics in the annex. Multicollinearity is limited as all tolerance 
values are above 0.10.
We observe in table 4 that – as expected – local legitimacy of local lead-
ership is signiﬁ  cantly lower in villages affected by agrarian reform and in vil-
lages where local brokers intermediate a larger share of the locally channelled 
resources. At the same time local legitimacy is higher in poorer regions. Pov-
erty is also higher in the less densely populated and less accessible Interior 
region. We did not control for the two most important socio-economic regions 
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the explanatory variables. Besides lower poverty, the Paciﬁ  c region is also 
characterized by higher education and higher use of local brokerage. Without 
doubt, the latter is due to the considerable higher presence of and experience 
with development support.
6.   Intermediation Structures at the Village Level
    After studying what inﬂ  uences local legitimacy of local leaders, 
in this section we will study the position of local brokers within local interme-
diation structures and how this is inﬂ  uenced by local and external variables. 
We are interested in the extent to which local brokers are used instead of other 
local intermediation mechanisms, and the extent to which local brokerage is 
concentrated in a limited number of brokers. Both issues are important if we 
want to determine the need and potential for local political change, as local 
brokers can have important political power. At the same time, we expect that 
there exist substantial differences as to the local intermediation structures 
that the different development projects try to construct.
The level of analysis remains the village level. We opt for aggregating 
per village all local resources that the multiple external interventions chan-
nel. By studying the aggregate picture we can look for structural variables 
that have a general effect on the intermediation structures at the village level, 
while we can still include variables that indicate the composition of the aggre-
gate development support to study the importance of the type of development 
support. The characterising variables of local intermediation structures that 
we want to explain are the proportion of locally intermediated relations with 
projects that have been intermediated by local brokers (BROK_INT) and the 
concentration of local brokerage (CENT_BROK).
A ﬁ  rst important dimension we expect to determine the use of local 
brokerage is the market-orientedness of the totality of relations with exter-
nal interventions in a village. This dimension is represented by an index 
that measures the relative presence of market-oriented or charity-oriented 
projects. This index, EXT_MARKET, is equal to the weighted sum of all 
relations, with the weight equal to the type of project (with 1 for projects 
without any ﬁ  nance component; 2 for projects with subsidised ﬁ  nance; and 
3 for projects that offer ﬁ  nance at market conditions) divided by the total 
number of relations.
The more market-oriented is external development support – i.e. the 
higher the proportion of operation costs that should be paid by local ben-
eﬁ  ciaries – the higher is the expected effort of the receiving party and thus 
the more serious the enforcement problem. This makes an important differ-
ence for the local intermediation mechanisms on which external interven-
tions rely. In table 2 (section 4) we have seen that all three types of projects 
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observe that market-oriented projects are more reluctant to make use of lo-
cal leadership, and local intermediation is more realised by non-leader peers. 
For market-oriented projects autonomy of local leadership is more important 
since this may have immediate effects on the ﬁ  nancial results of their opera-
tions. Local brokers may have too much local power so that by relying on 
local brokerage it may become difﬁ  cult for external interventions to ‘enforce’ 
a good agency. Moreover, local brokers often maintain a lot of patron-client 
relations that are characterised by rules of loyalty and paternalistic protection, 
which cannot easily be made compatible with the rules of a sustainable credit 
system, including the need to emphasise individual selection procedures and 
repayment under all conditions. Selection of beneﬁ  ciaries may be led by cli-
entelistic mediation and not by externally imposed criteria and local brokers 
may be reluctant to enforce the repayment of loans towards the clients.
In their attempt to inﬂ  uence the discriminatory power of local brokers, 
besides changing the use of local brokers development interventions can also 
change the level of responsibility that they transfer to these local intermedi-
aries. In this respect Bastiaensen (2000) showed how a rural credit program 
with sustainability objectives optimised its intermediation structure by reduc-
ing the decision power of local brokers. The program started its operations 
with local committees that were expected to select clients and administer (the 
disbursement and recuperation of) the funds. However, this intermediation 
scheme led to politically or religiously conditioned clientelistic mediation 
with non-satisfactory results in terms of repayment. A new intermediation 
scheme was implemented that was characterised by the participation of a neu-
tral administrator of the program in the local committee where he or she had 
a right of veto in all decisions. In this way, the program was able to discon-
nect selection and enforcement decisions from the prevailing local clientelis-
tic structures. In a recent phase even the remaining decision power of the 
local committee was completely transferred to the specialised personnel of 
the central banking ofﬁ  ce. In other words, a shift was made from the use of 
broker-agents to the use of local staff-agents.
Charity-oriented projects, in contrast, often delegate a lot of tasks to the 
local level as this agrees with the empowerment or democratisation discourse 
that many of these projects engage in. These projects often impose the crea-
tion of local committees as they expect them to guarantee local representation 
and accountability, and by this way making their services more responsive to 
local demands. However, local social structures in the Nicaraguan rural areas 
are seldom democratic, so that the creation of a local committee as such does 
not automatically guarantee local representation and accountability.
A second important dimension we expect to inﬂ  uence the use of local 
brokerage consists of the local characteristics that inﬂ  uence the comparative 
advantages of local brokers. In our conceptual section we have argued that 
local brokers have certain advantages to facilitate access of local people to 
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diate. However, we expect that local people resort relatively more to local 
brokers than to other peers in villages with lower education levels, higher 
poverty levels and higher intra-community differences of connectedness with 
urban centres (where most ofﬁ  ces of external interventions are located and 
thus access to important information is acquired), measured by the standard 
deviation of the number of visits per month to urban centres (ISOL_INEQ). 
In these villages local brokers have more comparative advantages than local 
peers to intermediate so that intermediation power is more concentrated in 
local brokers.
Also in communities with lower levels of recent immigration, meas-
ured by the village 5 percent trimmed mean of the number of years living 
in the community (YEAR_COM), and fewer personal conﬂ  icts, measured 
by the median number of personal conﬂ  icts (CONFL_COM), we expect that 
people rely more on local leaders. As constructing social networks takes time, 
recently arrived actors have less ample social networks. This makes these 
new actors to be less taken into account by local leaders, or in case these ac-
tors themselves hold a leading function they also take account of fewer people. 
The same happens in communities with a high number of personal conﬂ  icts.
Besides the use of local brokers we are also interested in the variables 
that inﬂ  uence the extent to which local brokerage is concentrated in a limited 
number of brokers. For this we will estimate a second model with the central-
ism of local brokerage as dependant variable. We expect this variable to be 
inﬂ  uenced by the historical presence of agrarian reform, AGR_REF and the 
village mean of the number of relations with external development interven-
tions, REL_EXT. Both the Nicaraguan agrarian reform and the presence of 
external development support have given important incentives for the forma-
tion of new local brokers, with a democratisation of local political spaces as 
an interesting result.
Table 5. Reliance on local brokers (OLS)
Dependent variable BROK_INT
Beta T Sig. Toler.a
EDUC_2 -0.602 -2.41 .024*** 0.226
POV_MUN 0.358 2.00 .056*** 0.444
ISOL_INEQ 0.508 3.04 .005*** 0.506
YEAR_COM 0.119 0.59 .563*** 0.346
CONFL_COM -0.246 -2.00 .056*** 0.931





Prob > chi2 b .160
a Tolerance value
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Multicollinearity problems are limited in both models as all tolerance 
values are above 0.10. The hypothesis of homoskedasticity cannot be rejected 
as indicated by the chi square test in tables 5 and 6. Visual examination of 
the partial regression plots conﬁ  rms the absence of normality and linearity 
violations. Univariate normality is also conﬁ  rmed in the table of descriptive 
statistics in the annex.
All coefﬁ  cients in the ﬁ  rst model have the expected sign, but not all 
are equally signiﬁ  cant. In table 5 we observe especially the very high coef-
ﬁ  cients of the village mean education level, the village internal differences 
of the connection to urban centres, and the relative presence of relations with 
market-oriented projects. At the same time it seems that social networks can 
be more rapidly constructed than expected, as the number of years that people 
live in the community has not been identiﬁ  ed as an important and signiﬁ  cant 
explanatory variable in our model. As to the model in table 6 we observe that 
both coefﬁ  cients are signiﬁ  cant and have the expected sign.
Table 6. Concentration of local brokerage (OLS)
Dependent variable CENT_BROK
Beta T Sig. Toler.a
AGR_REF -0.301 -2.71 .011** 0.838





Prob > chi2 b .603
a Tolerance value
b Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity, with Ho: Constant variance
A last comment is warranted on the interaction between local and ex-
ternal variables. External development interventions design intermediation 
schemes that they consider to be supportive of their objectives. However, 
since local characteristics exert a strong inﬂ  uence on local intermediation, 
how intermediation actually occurs can signiﬁ  cantly differ from the interme-
diation as desired by external actors. In some environments it is difﬁ  cult to 
implement a certain type of intermediation structure. To what extent external 
interventions can determine the structure of local intermediation then be-
comes an important research question.
The regression results in table 5 show that poverty, low education levels 
and the local inequality of remoteness to urban centres increase the reliance 
on local brokers, while market-oriented projects are reluctant to rely on lo-
cal brokers. This incompatibility and its consequences for the functioning of 
external development support are illustrated by a study of Bastiaensen and 
D’Exelle (2002) on a rural ﬁ  nance program. Patron-client networks and their 
associated rules of loyalty and paternalistic protection cannot easily be made 
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to emphasise individual selection procedures and repayment under all condi-
tions. The study indicates that poor, vulnerable communities might prefer 
defensive relationships of the ‘patron-client’ type to the relations with the 
rural ﬁ  nance program. As such these communities could thereby become 
‘conﬁ  ned’ to an institutional path that provides short-term risk mitigation but 
also involves longer-term disadvantages in terms of economic opportunities 
and distribution of power. In this process, the study also identiﬁ  ed an element 
of complicity on the part of many ‘charity’ development organisations, which 
continue to assist the poor in such communities with short-term subsidies, 
which are inevitably used by local patrons to maintain legitimacy towards 
their clients.
7.   Exclusion of Development Support at
 the  Village  Level
    Since the transfer of external resources to the local level is a 
main component of the operations of development interventions, an impor-
tant question is how should they be channelled so that externally imposed 
selection criteria are respected? Most projects impose certain beneﬁ  ciary se-
lection criteria that are based on individual characteristics that in practice are 
often imperfectly observable. Most characteristics such as income, housing 
conditions and even nutritional status of children may be strategically mis-
presented or even changed (Sen, 1995; De Herdt, 2000) to respond to the 
intervention’s selection criteria. This makes that selection criteria – if any 
– need to be assessed locally. However, assessing local characteristics is costly 
for external personnel. 
Local intermediary persons have informational advantages that can 
improve the targeting of the external intervention. However, it is not guar-
anteed that the use of local intermediaries will lead to better targeting. Local 
intermediaries may use other selection criteria since the access to external 
assistance may become an additional crucial component in the multi-stranded 
relations they maintain with community members and this may lead them to 
face incentives that do not coincide with the interests of the external interven-
tion. To improve targeting new targeting mechanisms have been designed in 
recent years based on self-selection (e.g. food for work programs) and condi-
tional transfers (e.g. food for education programs) (Conning & Kevane, 2002; 
Ravallion, 2003). However, also these new targeting mechanisms are inﬂ  u-
enced by local intermediation. Even when a development program explicitly 
evades local leaders, still spontaneous, local intermediation by peers exerts a 
large inﬂ  uence on the perceptions and the strategies of local agents.
In this section we study the level of exclusion of the totality of resourc-
es that the multiple external interventions channel to the local level and how 
local structural variables (including local intermediation) inﬂ  uence this ex-
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is impossible to use an aggregate goodness-of-ﬁ  t indicator of targeting since 
each intervention uses its own targeting criteria. However, by focusing on 
the aggregate picture we can look for structural variables that have a general 
effect on the exclusion or inclusion of certain groups, while we can control 
for the composition of the aggregate development support - and their inherent 
selection criteria - to study its importance.
To measure the exclusion from the totality of external resources we 
use the proportion of households without any access to external development 
support (EXT_EXCL). As we are interested in the exclusion of the poor (see 
discussion before in section 2d) we apply a poverty weight to each household, 
with poorer households having a higher weight in the index. For this poverty 
weight we use the poverty indicator used in section 4.
A ﬁ  rst set of variables that we expect to exert a determinant inﬂ  uence 
on the local distribution of external resources is local social capital. We un-
derstand social capital as the presence and quality of informal networks. In 
accordance with the arguments of Krishna (2001) we believe that informal 
networks are more relevant in Nicaraguan rural communities than formal 
organisational structures10. As to social capital we identify two types that 
inﬂ  uence the distribution of development support but each in a speciﬁ  c way. 
We differentiate between bonding social capital, which refers to close rela-
tions with family, friends and neighbours, and bridging social capital, which 
refers to relations between people of the same community that transcend the 
existing community cleavages (Woolcock, 2001).
As to bonding social capital we expect it to inﬂ  uence beneﬁ  ciary selec-
tion by means of three mechanisms. First, local brokers are leaders who have 
their clientele, which consists of poor people that are highly dependant on 
favours of their patron-leader. In table 3 we have seen that the poorer sectors 
make relatively more use of local brokerage. That is why we expect the use of 
local brokerage, measured by the percentage of all locally intermediated rela-
tions that are intermediated by brokers (BROK_INT), to reduce the exclusion 
of the poor.
However, there is also a limitation as to the use of local brokerage. The 
networks around local brokers have a limited scope, which makes that lo-
cal intermediaries have limited capacity and interest to direct the transfer 
of external resources to persons outside of their social networks. This has 
several effects. First, we expect that the more centralised is local brokerage 
(CENT_BROK), the higher the exclusion of the poor. Second, irrespective 
of the centralism of local brokerage, the fact that local brokers have limited 
social networks makes that the more projects are working in the community 
(EXT_NUM), the larger becomes the exclusion of external development sup-
port. This is similar to the conclusion of Galasso and Ravallion (2001), who 
found that within-village targeting improves with program-size. We attribute 
this effect to the fact that the access to outside interventions is signiﬁ  cantly 
10   The density of formal organisa-
tion is not an appropriate indica-
tor of social capital as this is highly 
dependant on the presence of ex-
ternal agencies. Local people create 
formal organisations on demand of 
external actors, but after the with-
drawal of these external actors 
formal organisations quickly disin-
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facilitated for (groups of) persons with certain skills, such as their mobilising 
capacity and their knowledge and strategic use of the existing development 
discourses in order to attract and convince outside interventions. However, 
these skills can only be acquired in the interaction with these outside inter-
ventions. This makes that previous experience with outside projects substan-
tially increases the probability to be reached by another project, so that (new) 
projects become concentrated in the same networks. At the same time in each 
community the same groups remain excluded from external interventions in-
dependently of the amount of projects that are working in the community, 
which highlights the structural problems of local social exclusion. In such a 
situation increasing the amount of projects increases the exclusion of exter-
nal development support. In contrast, concentrating resources in few projects 
forces local brokers to look for people outside of their networks.
As to bridging social capital, measured by community unity (UNIT_
COM), we expect it to reduce substantially the exclusion from external re-
sources. Local people who are embedded in social networks that transcend 
the existing social cleavages within the community take account of more peo-
ple for possible selection as beneﬁ  ciaries of the external interventions. We 
assessed this type of social capital by measuring the perceptions on networks 
of mutual support and collective action. The habitants were asked to attribute 
subjective ratings to three statements on these dimensions (with 1 = agree-
ment with the statement in all circumstances, 0.5 = agreement in certain cir-
cumstances, disagreement in other, 0 = disagreement in all circumstances) 
and the overall mean was used as index of community unity (see annex 3), 
UNIT_COM. Another variable we will include to measure bridging social 
capital is the percentage of people with personal problems with other people 
of the same community, PROBL_COM.
Another important socio-economic variable that we expect to exert a 
substantial inﬂ  uence on the beneﬁ  ciary selection of many development inter-
ventions is economic inequality. Galasso and Ravallion (2001) analysed its ef-
fect for one speciﬁ  c program, the Bangladesh’s Food-for-Education Program, 
and observed a positive correlation with the exclusion of the poor. We expect 
to conﬁ  rm this result for our cross section of projects. 
We are especially interested in the inequality of land ownership, which 
we measure by the village-level standard deviation of land property. Land ac-
cess is an indispensable means of survival in Nicaraguan rural communities. 
When differentiating between the two most important agro-socio-economic 
regions where the survey was realised, i.e. the Paciﬁ  c and the Interior region, 
we see that land property is especially important in the less densely populated 
and less developed Interior region where land is the most important resource. 
In contrast, in the more developed Paciﬁ  c region other resources can be im-
portant as well. That is why we multiplied this variable with a dummy that 
indicates the Paciﬁ  c/Interior region (with 1 = Paciﬁ  c region and 2 = Interior 
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Besides an important means of survival land property is often a deter-
minant source of local power, also within the local arenas around external 
development support. A large part of the rural development support reaches 
especially land-holding households, while land-poor households are relatively 
less covered. We expect the exclusion of the poor to be higher in communities 
with a higher land inequality and this for two reasons. First, charity projects 
give a large voice to local powerful actors. As the (land-)poor are weakly 
represented by local political actors, this limits drastically their chances to 
receive external economic resources. Second, some projects openly prefer the 
economically stronger households, who have a more privileged access to land 
resources. For the more risk-averse market-oriented projects these households 
are less risky and, because of scale economies, cheaper to attend. At the same 
time the smaller and more risk-averse households are more reluctant to enter 
into a risky contractual relation with these market-oriented projects. These 
mechanisms make that external development support in economically une-
qual communities does not succeed in reducing local poverty, but instead by 
reaching non-poor sectors reconﬁ  rms or even increases economic inequality.
To study the effect of the selection criteria imposed by external in-
terventions we included the market-orientedness of external interventions 
(EXT_MARKET) in the model. The contribution of EXT_MARKET can be 
divided in two effects, each working in the opposite direction. First, for the 
reasons indicated in the previous paragraph micro-ﬁ  nance projects and other 
market-oriented projects face large difﬁ  culties to reach the poor. Second, do-
nations are more prone to rent-capture by local elites.
We also expect that in communities with higher mean education levels 
(EDUC_2), the exclusion of external resources will be lower. In these com-
munities the difﬁ  cult communication between local people and external ac-
tors, due to the large differences between both life-worlds, will be somewhat 
smaller, reducing exclusion and auto-exclusion. Moreover, the poor will have 
more capacity to participate or to be represented within the local political 
arenas around development interventions.
Galasso and Ravallion (2001) also found that more isolated villages 
present higher difﬁ  culties for the poor to establish contact with a development 
intervention. The connectedness with urban centres, where development in-
terventions have their ofﬁ  ces will be measured by URB_TRAV, the natural 
logarithm of the 5 percent trimmed mean of the frequency to travel to the 
nearest urban centre (in times per month).
We also have to control for the presence of development support, meas-
ured by the village mean of the number of relations per household with ex-
ternal interventions (EXT_REL). We expect the exclusion of the poor from 
external development support to decrease with increasing presence of devel-
opment support. However, since a lot of variables inﬂ  uence both the presence 
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simultaneously estimate an equation that explains the presence of develop-
ment support.
We expect the presence of development support to increase with a high-
er number of development projects, lower average education levels (EDUC_
2) and higher community unity (UNIT_COM). The inﬂ  uence of the latter 
variable indicates that external interventions prefer the more united villages, 
which have a higher collective action capacity and are thus more comfort-
able working areas. The presence of conﬂ  icts between community members 
(CONFL_COM), which results uncorrelated with the community capacity of 
collective action, can be concealed towards the outside world to increase the 
probability of future cooperation with external actors and thus is not expected 
to inﬂ  uence the attraction of external development support.
Villages that suffered more severe damage caused by the devastating 
hurricane Mitch in October 1998 are expected to have received substantially 
more development support. To measure the damage we created an index equal 
to the village mean of the sum of three dummies, indicating damage to crops, 
damage to productive infrastructure and damage to housing infrastructure 
(MITCH). Also the villages with a higher past presence of agrarian reform 
continue to beneﬁ  t from the remaining local organisational structures that 
still attract “socialist” non-governmental development organisations. Finally 
we expect the presence of development support to be lower in villages in the 
less densely populated and less accessible, but also poorer interior region. For 
this we created a dummy (PAC_INT), with 1 for villages in the Paciﬁ  c region 
and 2 for villages in the Interior region.
In table 7 we observe the results of a regression model of a system of 
simultaneous equations that explains the exclusion of external development 
support, the amount of locally channelled resources, the centralism of local 
brokerage and the proportion of local brokerage within local intermediation. 
The last two equations in the model are the same as we used in previous sec-
tion.
As to the regression assumptions we tested for them after applying OLS 
to each of the individual equations. Heteroskedasticity is not present as in-
dicated by the chi square tests. Visual examination of the partial regression 
plots of the individual equations conﬁ  rms the absence of normality and lin-
earity violations, while univariate normality is also conﬁ  rmed in the table of 
descriptive statistics in the annex. Multicollinearity problems are limited as 
all tolerance values are above 0.10.
In the regression model we observe that channelling more resources 
reduces the exclusion of the poor. However, taking account of efﬁ  ciency – we 
cannot unlimitedly increase the channelled resources – we have to concen-
trate on the other explanatory variables. One of the most important of these 
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sion results conﬁ  rm that the exclusion of locally distributed external devel-
opment support is lower in villages with higher levels of community unity 
(UNIT_COM), where local intermediation is more realized by local brokers 
(BROK_INT) or where local brokerage is less centralized (CENT_BROK). 
The latter is the case in agrarian reform villages and where a lot of resources 
are channelled, as indicated by the third equation in the model.
As expected land inequality (LAND_INEQ) increases the exclusion 
of external resources. As to URB_TRA V , we obtained an opposite sign to 
what expected. A higher village mean of the frequency of visits to the nearest 
urban centre increases the exclusion of the poor. More visits to urban cen-
tres makes that a lot of people spend time outside of their community. This 
hinders a smooth circulation of local information and reduces social control 
on what happens within the community, including the local distribution of 
externally provided private goods.
By adding this ﬁ  nal piece of analysis to our previous analyses on the 
determinants of local legitimacy of local brokers and the structure of local 
brokerage (respectively in sections 5 and 6), we are able to address the ques-
tions as to how and to which extent external interventions can steer local 
intermediation, in an endeavour to change local political structures in favour 
of the poor. Now it is time to put these three pieces together and to derive 
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Table 7. Explanatory model on the exclusion of external development support (3SLS)
Equations EXT_EXCL EXT_REL CENT_BROK BROK_INT
Coef.a T Sig.*** Toler. b Coef.a T Sig.*** Toler. b Coef.a T Sig.*** Toler. b Coef.a T Sig.***
MITCH 0.384 2.27 .025*** 0.633
AGR_REF 0.922 3.18 .002*** 0.674 -0.353 -2.75 .007*** 0.838
EDUC_2 -0.026 -1.18 .242*** 0.145 -0.184 -2.38 .019*** 0.284 -0.126 -2.70 .008***
CONFL_COM 0.066 0.62 .535*** 0.744 0.452 0.93 .354*** 0.874 -0.605 -2.34 .021***
UNIT_COM -0.579 -3.98 .000*** 0.774 1.425 2.52 .013*** 0.730
PAC_INT -0.089 -2.04 .044*** 0.185 -0.314 -2.02 .047*** 0.317
EXT_NUM 0.007 1.36 .178*** 0.572 0.038 2.01 .047*** 0.658
CENT_BROK 0.471 2.41 .018*** 0.578
BROK_INT -0.284 -3.01 .003*** 0.403
LAND_INEQ 0.032 1.90 .060*** 0.233
URB_TRAV 0.029 1.76 .082*** 0.435
EXT_MARKET -0.045 -1.05 .298*** 0.475 -0.457 -5.48 .000***
EXT_REL -0.224 -2.90 .005*** 0.386 -0.133 -2.07 .041*** 0.838
YEAR_COM 71E-5 0.18 .858***
ISOL_INEQ 0.032 3.20 .002***
POV_MUN 0.093 1.75 .083***
Constant 0.606 3.14 .002*** -0.773 -1.09 .280*** 0.795 17.20 .000*** 1.252 4.71 .000***
N 3 33 33 33 3
R2 0.785 0.607 0.372 0.627
F-ratio 22.13 8.10 10.79 9.95
F-probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Prob > chi2 c .610 .682 .603 .160
a Non-standardized  coefﬁ   cients
b  Tolerance values after applying OLS to each equation separately
c  Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity, after applying OLS to each
 equation  separately 
8.  Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
    This paper has provided some elements that are needed to ad-
dress the important question of how external support should be articulated 
with the local level to contribute to a sustainable poverty reduction. A general 
starting point of the paper is that local arenas substantially inﬂ  uence the func-
tioning of development interventions. At the same time these interventions 
cannot control the actions local people undertake in the local arenas. That is 
why we have looked for an explanatory model of the structure of these arenas 
to understand how and to which extent development interventions can inﬂ  u-
ence them. We have also studied how and to which extent these arenas inﬂ  u-
ence the exclusion of external development support. Local people struggle to 
capture part of the economic resources that are channelled by external actors 
and it is all but evident that the poorer sectors have equal access to external 
development support. Sustainable poverty reduction, however, requires the 
opening of local political structures in favour of the poor who are politically 
excluded.
An important dimension of these local arenas is the way the relations 
between external interventions and local beneﬁ  ciaries are established, and es-
pecially what local intermediation mechanisms are used. Both external inter-
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These local persons can execute a representative function for local people or 
can be only accidental intermediaries. In the former case they are real “bro-
kers” that intermediate between both worlds and are expected to defend the 
interests of both the external intervention and local people. They are in an 
ambivalent position and pay attention to maintain their legitimacy towards 
both parties. Empirical analysis has shown that their legitimacy (towards lo-
cal people) is higher in poorer regions, while it is lower in communities where 
brokers intermediate proportionally more resources. Their local legitimacy is 
also lower in agrarian reform regions.
An important aspect of local intermediation consists of the use level of 
these local brokers. It seems that for both local and external actors there exists 
an optimal level of the use of local brokerage. On the one hand both external 
interventions and local people need local brokers. For local people local bro-
kers increase the community’s capacity to attract external resources and they 
channel resources to the poorer sectors more than other local intermediation 
mechanisms do. For external actors local brokers can substantially facilitate 
their operations as they have better local information, they have the capacity 
to contribute to the analysis of local problems, and they have the ability to 
convoke and convince local people.
On the other hand, the use of local brokerage may not be too high. The 
more use is made of local brokerage the lower becomes their local legitimacy. 
At ﬁ  rst sight this seems somewhat paradoxical: a higher use of local brokers 
reduces the exclusion of the poor from external resources, but at the same 
time it also reduces local support for local brokers. Local brokers are highly 
needed, as without them the poor would be more excluded. However, local 
brokers are also more visible than other intermediation mechanisms (such 
as local intermediation by peers non-leaders or other occasional contacts) 
and can be easily marked to be responsible for possible unfair distributions. 
In poor rural villages the local distribution of external resources is a very 
delicate matter. Local brokers, however, generally favour their own networks, 
which have a limited scope. This makes that the more access to develop-
ment support is intermediated by local brokers, the more people feel unfairly 
treated by some of these brokers.
Also for external interventions, local brokerage may not be too high. 
The higher the use of local brokerage the higher the power of local brokers, 
and it may become difﬁ  cult for external interventions to enforce them to be-
have in accordance with the interventions’ agendas. Especially for market-
oriented projects autonomy of local leadership is important since this may 
have immediate effects on the ﬁ  nancial results of their operations. Local bro-
kers often maintain a lot of patron-client relations, which are characterised by 
rules of loyalty and paternalistic protection. These rules, however, cannot eas-
ily be made compatible with the rules of a sustainable credit system, including 
the need to emphasise objective individual selection procedures and repay-
ment under all conditions. Market-oriented programs are also more prudent 
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nisms to improve beneﬁ  ciary selection and contract compliance. One of such 
mechanisms is the common practice of conditional renewing of the loans by 
micro-ﬁ  nance projects to enforce repayment by the individual beneﬁ  ciaries. 
In a similar way, Platteau and Gaspart (2003) argue in favour of se-
quential disbursements to discipline local brokers from the outside. Another 
method can be designed to discipline local brokers from within the communi-
ty, such as for instance an adequate management of information transmission. 
Many people obtain knowledge of the existence of a project by means of a 
local broker. The people that do not know of the presence of external interven-
tions (or the access conditions) are automatically excluded. To the extent that 
the information on the intervention arrives at highly deprived persons that do 
not form part of the networks around the local intermediaries of a particular 
project (for instance by using local intermediation structures that exist around 
other projects) these persons obtain the means to pressurise local brokers to 
take account of them. This brings us to the point of the concentration of local 
brokerage, which may not be too high, as it increases the exclusion of develop-
ment resources.
One of the key questions then becomes how external interventions can 
optimise both the use level and the concentration level of local brokerage. To 
be able to do so external interventions should at least realise permanent local 
appraisals in the communities with appropriate attention to the social embed-
dedness of each possible local broker. To take corrective measures, external 
actors - if necessary - could split up resources and channel them towards 
different and independent local brokers, and preferably the brokers with most 
ample local networks. For this, in addition to identifying local brokers it may 
be necessary to train new agents where it is difﬁ  cult to ﬁ  nd local intermediar-
ies with sufﬁ  cient capacity. The principal aim of this political entrepreneur-
ship is the democratisation of the coverage of local brokerage, i.e. obtaining 
a local brokerage that represents the largest possible and poorest part of the 
local population.
All types of projects that are honest with their objectives of reducing 
poverty and capability inequalities should make efforts to democratise local 
arenas. The feasibility of an intermediation structure, however, is not com-
pletely independent of local structures. In some environments it is more dif-
ﬁ  cult to implement a certain type of intermediation structure than in other 
environments. This means also that the democratisation of local arenas can 
face serious local resistance. We have seen that in agrarian reform villages 
local brokerage has become less centralised but it also faces lower local legiti-
macy. The old leaders had to share local power with new leaders, so that local 
brokerage became less monopolised. This increased rivalry between local 
brokers and social cleavages in the community, reducing the local legitimacy 
of local brokerage. This indicates that it is all but evident to change the per-
sistent ‘caudillo’ structures, which are a product of the colonial inheritance 
and up to day continue to inﬂ  uence economic and political exchange in Latin 
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Besides these cultural constraints, the articulation of external support 
with the local level is also constrained by the stages of economic development. 
Community imperfections substantially increase with economic development 
(Platteau & Abraham, 2002). Our data conﬁ  rm this as they show that com-
munities in more developed regions have signiﬁ  cantly lower levels of commu-
nity unity (partial correlation: 0.384; sig. .030**) and less legitimacy of local 
leadership (partial correlation: 0.684; sig. .000***).
There are also important differences between development programs 
as to their capacity to democratise local arenas. Charity-oriented interven-
tions often create local committees, which they expect to guarantee local 
representation and accountability. Local social structures in the Nicaraguan 
rural areas are, however, seldom democratic. As charity-oriented projects do 
not intervene in the formation of local committees, these committees tend to 
replicate local power structures. This makes that charity-oriented projects are 
susceptible to be used by local brokers in their search for local legitimisation 
of their power and thus to conﬁ  rm existing power relations and exclusion 
processes.
Market-oriented projects are less vulnerable because they diversify lo-
cal intermediation mechanisms. Although they often do not have the explicit 
intention to change local power structures - they try to bypass local brokers 
to safeguard a good selection of beneﬁ  ciaries and a high repayment of their 
credit loans - we expect them to offer better perspectives for improving lo-
cal power structures than charity-oriented development projects. At the same 
time, they often channel more resources, so that they have better perspectives 
for local economic change. However, the direction of this economic change 
and thus its consequences for local power distribution and social exclusion 
depends a lot on the outreach of the intervention. This brings us to a revision 
of the traditional argument in favour of targeting. Traditionally, the analysis 
of local political structures has been limited to its effect on the success of tar-
geting as a means to reach poorer sectors. However, if we consider local po-
litical change to be an end of targeting at the same level of poverty reduction 
and income inequality, a renewed interest in targeting may be warranted.
The transfer of development resources to the local level can also have 
other types of side effects on local society. We believe in particular that char-
ity-oriented programs that use an anti-poverty discourse and pose few ac-
cess restrictions entail the danger of corroding community unity. In countries 
where a large part of the population considers itself to be poor, most people 
expect having a right of access to the development support. Locally chan-
nelled resources are, however, generally limited. That is why it is impossible 
to satisfy all needs, so that conﬂ  icts easily occur. These arguments are simi-
lar to Laurent (2001) who observed how the arrival of external development 
support and the rise of local “big men” have created a permanent uncertainty 
within a local village in Burkina Faso. Local co-ﬁ  nancing (in whichever form; 
e.g. food-for-work programs) may reduce this tension, since it may lower the 
incentives to engagement, even leading to complete self-exclusion of certain 
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A ﬁ  nal remark is required on the behavioural rules that constrain hu-
man interaction. Norms of collective action, norms of distributive justice, 
behavioural norms that constrain the actions of local leaders and the exter-
nally imposed contract rules of the intervention are all important in our story. 
The extent to which local interactions respect and (re)-create these rules and 
norms can have a determinant inﬂ  uence on beneﬁ  ciary selection. Behavioural 
norms are of determinant importance for the structure and the outcome of 
interactions between local people and across the local-external divide. At the 
same time these behavioural norms are also the result of the cumulative out-
come of these interactions. We are aware that the present situation depends 
on previous interactions between people, thus history matters. Although we 
did not enter into the dynamics and the evolution of structure and norms (we 
limited the analysis to the present situation of structural variables that we 
expect to have inﬂ  uenced on past interactions), we think this warrants more 
attention. Experimental economics and multi-agent modelling are promising 
techniques that permit to take due account of adaptive behaviour (learning, 
norms, customs, etc.), bounded rationality and bargaining and thus have the 
potential to improve the assessment of changes in local social structures and 
norms and how local and external actors are expected to inﬂ  uence them.
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 Annex:
1.   Descriptive statistics and normality test
  (variables are ordered as to their appearance in the paper)
33 observations Descriptives Shapiro-Francia
Normality test 
Min Max Mean S.D. Z Sig.
1 LEAD_LEG Index of local legitimacy of local leadership (see annex 2) 0.41 0.88 0.68 0.13 0.625 .266
2 POV_MUN Poverty level in the municipality that covers the village, with 
1 = low poverty, 2 = medium poverty and 3 = high poverty
1.00 3.00 2.18 0.68 -27.648 1.000
3 BROK_REL The squared root of the proportion of relations with 
projects that was intermediated by brokers
0.33 0.77 0.54 0.12 0.754 .225
4 AGR_REF The squared root of the percentage of households that 
received land by agrarian reform
0.00 0.68 0.34 0.19 -0.771 .780
5 CENT_BROK The squared root of the sum of the squared shares 
(Herﬁ  ndahl index) of the different brokers within the total 
amount of relations intermediated by brokers
0.39 1.00 0.66 0.16 0.951 .171
6 EDUC_1 The village mean of the household education level (= mean 
education level of all household members >= 18 years), 
excluding the households that occupy a leader position
1.32 5.76 3.01 1.08 0.288 .387
7 BROK_INT The squared proportion of local intermediations of 
relations with projects that was realised by brokers
0.10 1.00 0.57 0.24 -0.466 .679
8 EDUC_2 Village mean education level of all persons >= 18 years 1.46 5.76 3.11 1.10 0.187 .426
9 ISOL_INEQ Standard deviation of frequency to travel to nearest urban 
centre
1.08 12.49 6.02 3.41 0.953 .170
10 YEAR_COM The 5 percent trimmed village mean of the number of years 
living in the community
4.00 42.98 24.79 10.27 0.123 .451
11 CONFL_COM The squared root of the percentage of households that ever 
had a problem with someone of the community
0.09 0.56 0.36 0.10 0.511 .305
12 EXT_MARKET Aggregate level of market-orientedness of the relations with 
interventions
0.33 1.74 1.06 0.32 -0.910 .819
13 EXT_REL The natural logarithm of the village mean of the number of 
relations with projects
-0.79 0.94 0.13 0.44 -0.190 .575
14 EXT_EXCL Proportion of households excluded of all development 
resources (after applying poverty weight)
0.11 0.70 0.38 0.17 -0.402 .656
15 MITCH Index of village average damage caused by hurricane 
Mitch, equal to the village mean of the sum of three 
dummies, indicating damage to crops, damage to productive 
infrastructure and damage to housing infrastructure
0.46 1.65 1.13 0.33 -0.782 .783
16 UNIT_COM Index of community unity (see annex 3) 0.29 0.67 0.50 0.09 -1.023 .847
17 PAC_INT Dummy with 1 for villages in the Paciﬁ  c region and 2 for 
villages in the Interior region
1.00 2.00 1.52 0.51 -117.708 1.000
18 EXT_NUM Number of development interventions present in the village 3.00 14.00 8.33 2.81 -0.895 .815
19 LAND_INEQ The natural logarithm of the multiplication between the 
standard deviation of land property and PAC_INT
0.67 5.19 3.18 1.23 -0.000 .501
20 URB_TRAV The natural logarithm of the 5 percent trimmed mean of 
the frequency to travel to nearest urban centre (in times 
per month)
-0.26 2.71 1.00 0.77 0.964 .16844 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2004-03
2.  Index of Local Legitimacy of Local Leadership
Correlation Matrix
Perception on capacity Perception on fairness Perception on unselﬁ  shness
Perception on capacity  1,000 0,833  (.000) 0.701  (.000)
Perception on fairness  0,833  (.000) 1,000 0.829  (.000)
Perception on unselﬁ  shness 0,701  (.000) 0,829  (.000) 1,000
33 observations
Note: Signiﬁ  cance levels between parentheses
3. Community  Perceptions  Index
Perception 1:  If someone in the community has economic problems people  
 help  this  person.
Perception 2:  This community is very united.
Perception 3:  In case of a crisis or an emergency the community comes
  together to solve the problem.
Correlation Matrix
Perception 1 Perception 2 Perception 3
Perception 1 1,000 0,483 (.004) 0,689 (.000)
Perception 2 0,483 (.004) 1,000 0,416 (.016)
Perception 3 0,689 (.000) 0,416 (.016) 1,000
33 observations
Note: Signiﬁ  cance levels between parentheses